In my last article I entered into an analysis of tlie different forms of volition, and showed that in each case tlie process con-sists in the co-operation of two of the psychoeal elements which together constitute our personal integrity; namely, the Intellectual and the iEsthetic ; that the intellectual is the regulative and directive element of " the willwhile the sesthetic is the dynamic or active element, and consists of either a sensation, an appetite, or an emotion, which, when it reacts through the regulative element, and is directed by it to its appropriate and special object or end, assumes the form of a special desire to act for the attainment of that end. 
Part III.
(<Continued from No. ix. p. 24.) In my last article I entered into an analysis of tlie different forms of volition, and showed that in each case tlie process con- sists in the co-operation of two of the psychoeal elements which together constitute our personal integrity; namely, the Intellectual and the iEsthetic ; that the intellectual is the regulative and directive element of " the willwhile the sesthetic is the dynamic or active element, and consists of either a sensation, an appetite, or an emotion, which, when it reacts through the regulative element, and is directed by it to its appropriate and special object or end, assumes the form of a special desire to act for the attainment of that end. It was then seen to follow, that what are called "motives" to "the will," consist of our various sensations, appetites, and emotions, when subjected to the judgment of the understanding in deliberation, and balanced against each other in reference to good or evil: that one or the other of these " motives," therefore, always constitutes the dynamic or active element of " the will" itself; and that what particular "motive" shall constitute this element of "the will," on any given occasion, must depend on its superior influence over others that may, at the same time, be presented to, or excited by, the un- as if seeing a thing to be true or false was an action, or had anything to do with the will." Let us observe the train of thought by which this great and venerable man appears to have been led to this conclusion. By " action" he evidently meant, not intellection, but an external act producing movement. Now finding that the judgment of the understanding?especially the speculative judgment?has * The above view of the nature and operations of "the will" sets at rest the long and hotly-debated question, whether, or how, "motives" act on or determine the "will." "The great question," says Dugald Stewart, "is, How do these motives determine the will ?" And again, " The question is not concerning the influence of motives, but concerning the nature of that influence."?Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers. Appendix, sect. iv. (vol. vi. p. 346, of Hamilton's Stewart.) f Essay on the Freedom of the Will. 110 immediate power of exciting a voluntary movement, lie therefore concluded that the understanding is passive; and so in this sense it really is, although in its practical capacity it is one of the constituent elements, and therefore one of the essential conditions, of the will. "The last perception or judgment of the understanding," says Dr. Clarke, " is entirely passive." But the "first exertion of the self-moving power," he continues, "is essentially active." Therefore (he concluded) the understanding cannot be the self-moving power?that is, the free-will. But if the free-will is not the understanding, much less could it he supposed to consist of the mere brute faculty of sense or appetite. There was therefore invented a special self-moving faculty, which was supposed to be independent of all the senses, the appetites, and the understanding. The founded on a careful analysis of different forms of volition is consistent with itself and competent to afford a satisfactory explanation of the facts to which it may be applied, but that every opposite theory that has been proposed, when properly examined and tried by a similar test, has proved to be wholly untenable, and, when followed out to its logical consequences, has resulted in absurdity and contradiction.
It cannot fail to be perceived, that the facts elicited and the conclusions drawn in the course of this discussion must bring into clearer light many at least of the obscurities that belong to the dark and difficult question of moral liberty. For the consideration of this subject, however, the urgency of my 
